We show the generic finiteness of the number of probability distributions on outcomes induced by Nash equilibria for two-person game forms such that either (i) one of the players has no more than two strategies or (ii) both of the players have three strategies, and (iii) for outcome game forms with three players, each with at most two strategies. Finally, we exhibit an example of a game form with three outcomes and three players for which the Nash equilibria of the associated game induce a continuum of payoffs for an open non-empty set of utility profiles.
Introduction
In normal form games with an arbitrary number of players the payoffs of which may be perturbed independently Rosenmüller (1971) and Wilson (1971) simultaneously proved (see also Harsanyi 1973) that generically there is a finite number of equilibria. This result was extended to extensive form games by Kreps and Wilson (1982) . On the other hand, Govindan and McLennan (2001) and Kukushkin, Litan, and Marhuenda (2008) show that the situation for outcome game forms is entirely different. These authors construct some game forms for which there is a continuum of probability distributions on outcomes induced by the Nash equilibria of the associated games for an open non-empty set of utility profiles.
A natural question that arises is to try to determine which outcome game forms admit a finite number of probability distributions on outcomes induced by Nash equilibria. For example, Mas-Colell (2010) proved that for two player game forms the equilibrium payoffs are generically finite, and Govindan and McLennan (2001) proved that for game forms with two outcomes and any number of players the number of equilibrium distributions is generically finite. Similar results are obtained for game forms with two players and three outcomes (González-Pimienta 2010) and sender-receiver cheap-talk games (Park 1997) . Using semi-algebraic geometry techniques Govindan and McLennan (1998) showed in an unpublished manuscript the generic finiteness of the number of equilibrium distributions on outcomes, when the associated game is either a two player zero sum or a common interest game. This result is also proved by Litan and Marhuenda (2012) using elementary linear algebra.
In this paper we prove the generic finiteness of the number of probability distributions on outcomes induced by Nash equilibria for two-person outcome game forms in which one of the players has no more than two strategies or both of the players have three strategies. The results of González-Pimienta (2010) and Govindan and McLennan (2001) imply that for two-person outcome game forms with at most three outcomes the number of equilibrium distributions is generically finite. We provide an example of an outcome game form with three outcomes and three players for which the Nash equilibria of the associated games induce a continuum of probability distributions on outcomes for an open non-empty set of utility profiles. Finally, we show that for outcome game forms with three players, each with at most two strategies, generic finiteness of the number of probability distributions on outcomes induced by Nash equilibria is obtained.
Outcome game forms
A (finite, pure) L-person outcome game form (on Ω) is defined by Govindan and McLennan (2001) as a tuple (S 1 , . . . , S L , φ) such that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, S i is a finite nonempty set, and φ : S → Ω, where Ω is a finite nonempty set (the set of outcomes) and
. . , L, where ∆ + (S i ) denotes the set of strictly positive probability measures on S i .
We say that a subset of a Euclidean space is generic if it contains an open and dense subset of this Euclidean space.
3 Distributions on outcomes and minimality for two-person outcome game forms Let (S 1 , S 2 , φ) be an outcome game form with two players, where S 1 = {1, 2, . . . , m}, S 2 = {1, 2, . . . , n} and S = S 1 × S 2 . For each outcome ω ∈ Ω the mapping φ defines the m × n matrix φ ω with values in {0, 1}, whose (r, s) entry is 1 if φ(r, s) = ω and 0 otherwise. For r ∈ S 1 , s ∈ S 2 denote φ rs = φ(r, s) ∈ Ω. To each u ∈ R Ω we assign the matrix
for all i ∈ S 1 and j ∈ S 2 , where throughout, for u ∈ R Ω , M i· (u) and M ·j (u) denote row i and column j of the matrix M (u), xM (u) and M (u)y are regarded as elements of R n and R m , and the scalar product of z and z , z, z ∈ R k , is written z · z or simply as zz . The strategies x ∈ ∆(S 1 ) and y ∈ ∆(S 2 ) of the players induce a probability distribution on Ω that assigns the probability xφ ω y to the outcome ω ∈ Ω.
Let θ = (θ ω ) ω∈Ω be the vector of |Ω| variables. Then, M [θ] = ω∈Ω θ ω φ ω is a matrix the rs entry θ rs of which is θ φ(r,s) . Note that the matrix M [θ] determines the outcome game form φ in a trivial way by setting φ(r, s) = θ rs Hence, we identify the matrix M [θ] with the outcome game form (S 1 , S 2 , φ).
Then V is a generic subset of R Ω . Kukushkin, Litan, and Marhuenda (2008) provide an example of an outcome game form with two players in which, for a non-empty open set of utility profiles, there is a continuum of outcome distributions induced by the Nash equilibria. In that example the first player has three strategies and the second player has four strategies. The next theorem shows the example is minimal in terms of strategies. 
then there is a generic set W ⊆ R Ω such that for any u 1 , u 2 ∈ W the set of CMNEs of the game g φ u induce finitely many probability distributions on outcomes.
Proof. We may assume that the rows of φ (that is, φ r· = (φ rs ) s∈S 2 , r ∈ S 1 ) are pairwise distinct. Indeed, for any utility profile in R Ω × R Ω the set of distributions on outcomes induced by (completely mixed) Nash equilibria is not changed if multiple rows are eliminated. A similar assumption refers to the columns of φ (that is, φ ·s = (φ rs ) r∈S 1 , s ∈ S 2 ). Hence, we may assume without loss of generality that |{φ r· : r ∈ S 1 }| = m, |{φ ·s : s ∈ S 2 }| = n, and m n.
(1)
We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: m = 1
As u 2 ∈ V, any Nash equilibrium selects the unique arg max s2∈S2 u 2 (φ 1s ), and, hence a CMNE can only exist if n = 1.
If there are s, s ∈ S 2 , s = s , such that φ 1s = φ 1s , then let (x, y) be a Nash equilibrium. If u 2 ∈ V, then by (1) we may assume that u 2 (φ 2s ) < u 2 (φ 2s ) so that y s = 0. Thus, (x, y) is not completely mixed and there is nothing to prove in this subcase. Similarly, we may proceed if φ 2s = φ 2s . Therefore, we shall now assume that n = |{φ rs : s ∈ S 2 }| for r = 1, 2.
If n = 2, let W = {u ∈ V : h(u) = 0}, where h(θ) = θ 11 θ 22 − θ 12 θ 21 is a polynomial in |Ω| variables.
Notice that h = 0, by (1) and (2). Thus, the set W is generic and there exists at most one completely mixed Nash equilibrium provided that u 1 , u 2 ∈ W.
We now assume that n 3. Define the polynomial f in |Ω| variables by
Claim: If f (u 2 ) = 0 then the game g φ u has no CMNE. If x is a mixed strategy of 1 such that 2 is indifferent between the payoff columns u ·1 , u ·2 , and u ·3 , then
We conclude that
Therefore f (u 2 ) = 0 so that our claim has been proved. Now the proof in this case can be completed. By (1) there exists s ∈ S 2 such that φ 1s = φ 2s . By (2) there exists s ∈ S 2 \ {s} such that φ 2s = φ 1s so that we may assume without loss of generality that φ 11 = φ 21 and φ 11 = φ 22 .
By (2) and (5),
Hence, we conclude that f = 0, so that W = {u ∈ V : f (u) = 0} is generic. By our claim, W has the desired properties.
Case 3: m = n = 3
It suffices to describe a suitable generic set of utilities for player 2. We distinguish 2 cases.
(1) There exists i ∈ S 1 such that φ i1 = φ i2 = φ i3 . We may assume that i = 3. Let u ∈ V. If x is a completely mixed strategy of 1 such that 2 is indifferent between the columns, then let
x1+x2 ∈ ∆ + ({1, 2}) and observe that (4) must hold. Also, we may assume that (2) holds, because otherwise there exist two payoff columns that differ only in one coordinate so that a completely mixed Nash equilibrium is ruled out. By (1) there exists ∈ S 2 such that φ 1 = φ 2 so that (5) may be assumed and the proof may be finished by literally copying the corresponding part of the case m = 2.
(2) For any k ∈ S 1 , |{φ k : ∈ S 2 }| 2.
Consider again the polynomial f defined in (3). If x is a mixed strategy that makes 2 indifferent between all columns, then
Claim: If the system of equations (7) has multiple solutions, then f (u 2 ) = 0 and |{φ k : ∈ S 2 }| = 3, for every k ∈ S 1 . As (7) has multiple solutions, the columns of the matrix are not linearly independent. Thus, there exists z ∈ R 3 , z = 0, such that
By (7) we conclude that z 3 = 0. Moreover, as u ∈ V, our assumptions imply that z 1 = 0 and, similarly z 2 = 0. Hence, we may assume (after replacing z by z/z 1 if necessary) that z 1 = 1. Hence, with λ = −z 2 , we have
Thus, f (u 2 ) = 0. As by our assumption, one of these differences in each row is nonzero, all of them are nonzero and we conclude that |{φ k : ∈ S 2 }| = 3 for all k ∈ S 1 and the claim follows. Now the proof can be completed. If, for any u ∈ V, (7) has one or no solution, then W = V has the desired properties. In the other case, let u ∈ V such that (7) has multiple solutions. Hence, |{φ k : ∈ S 2 }| = 3 for all k ∈ S 1 . By (1) we conclude that {φ 1 : = 1, 2, 3} = {φ 2 : = 1, 2, 3} so that we may assume that φ 11 = φ 2 , = 1, 2, 3. Let ε > 0 be small enough such that u ∈ U, where u is the utility function that differs from u only inasmuch as u(φ 11 ) = u(φ 11 ) + ε. Then f ( u) = f (u) + ε(u 22 − u 23 ) = 0 so that f is not the zero polynomial. Thus, W = {u ∈ V : f (u) = 0} is a generic set with the desired properties.
Outcome game forms with three players
The first example of an outcome game form in which there is a continuum of distributions on outcomes induced by the Nash equilibria of the associated games for an open non-empty set of utility profiles was provided by Govindan and McLennan (2001) . Their example had three players and six outcomes. On the other hand, for any outcome game form with two outcomes they prove generic finiteness of the number of Nash equilibrium outcome distributions, and González-Pimienta (2010) shows this generic finiteness for two-person game forms with three outcomes. Finally, Kukushkin, Litan, and Marhuenda (2008) provide an example of an outcome game form with two players and four outcomes in which there is a continuum of outcome distributions induced by the Nash equilibria of the associated games for an open non-empty set of utility profiles. Thus, it is natural to ask if four is the minimum number of outcomes needed to construct outcome game forms which do not generically have finitely many distributions on Ω induced by Nash equilibria. However, the next example shows that the results in González-Pimienta (2010) cannot be extended to three players. That is, a three-person game form with three outcomes a, b, and c may allow a continuum of outcome distributions induced by Nash equilibria for an open non-empty set of utility profiles.
In Section 4.2 we show the generic finiteness for outcome game forms with three players, each with at most two strategies.
An example with three players and three outcomes
Let Ω = {a, b, c}, S 1 = {N, E, S, W }, S 2 = {L, R} and S 3 = {U, D}. We use the notation of Section 3 of Govindan and McLennan (2001) and consider the game form
so that player 1 selects the row, player 2 the column, and player 3 the matrix. Moreover, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
, and c i = u i (c). If a i > max{b i , c i } for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then we may define, for any p with 0 p t := a3−b3 2a3−b3−c3 , the strategy profile X(p) = ((p, q, r, s), (y, 1 − y), (z, 1 − z)) by
It is straightforward to show that X(p) is a Nash equilibrium that induces the payoff
2a1−b1−c1 for the row player. Let π 2 (p) denote the payoff of the column player. We may easily compute
so that π 2 (0) = π 2 (t) for a nonempty open subset of utility profiles. Moreover, if π 2 (0) = π 2 (t), then by continuity of π 2 : [0, t] → R, there is a continuum of payoffs of the column player induced by the completely mixed Nash equilibria X(p), 0 < p < t. A similar statement is valid for the matrix player.
On the other hand, we show in Section 4.2 that if each of the players has at most two strategies, generically the number of probability distributions on outcomes induced by the Nash equilibria of the game is finite.
Outcome game forms with three players and two strategies each
Let Ω be the finite non-empty set of outcomes. We consider an outcome game form (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , φ) with three players and two strategies each, i.e., we assume that S 1 = S 2 = S 3 = {1, 2}. Let (θ ω ) ω∈Ω be the vector of |Ω| variables and (θ ω ) (ω∈Ω, ∈{1,2,3}) be the vector of 3|Ω| variables. We denote by For any finite F ⊆ R[(θ ω ) ω∈Ω, ∈{1,2,3} ], let U F be defined by
Note that U F is an open and dense subset of (R Ω ) 3 .
Now we are able to prove the following main result of this section.
Theorem 4.1. For any three-person pure outcome game form (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , φ) with S 1 = S 2 = S 3 = {1, 2} there is a generic set U of utility profiles such that, for any u = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) ∈ U , the set of CMNEs of the game g φ u induce finitely many probability distributions on outcomes.
Proof. We may assume that the number of CMNEs is not generically finite. Also, by Theorem 3.1, we may assume that none of the players i = 1, 2, 3 is a dummy, where i is dummy if φ is invariant under any permutation of S i . Hence, by renaming the players if necessary, we assume that, for each utility profile u = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) in an open and nonempty subset Y of R Ω × R Ω × R Ω , there are infinitely many completely mixed strategies for player 1 that may be extended to CMNEs by suitably chosen strategies of the remaining players.
It suffices to show that there exists a finite F ⊆ R[(θ ω ) ω∈Ω, ∈{1,2,3} ] such that, for any u ∈ U F ∩ Y, the set of probability measures on Ω induced by CMNEs is finite.
The probability of each outcome is its coefficient in the polynomial H. Let x = x 1 , x 2 = 1 − x, y = y 1 , y 2 = 1 − y, z = z 1 , z 2 = 1 − z. The polynomial H may be written as 
we have the equations
By (13) and (15),
By (14), z(a 2 x + d 2 ) = f 2 − b 2 x and, by (16),
so that, with
we have rx 2 + px + q = 0.
Let P, Q, R ∈ R[(θ ω ) ω∈Ω, ∈{1,2,3} ] be the polynomials that correspond to p, q, r, that is,
We now define the set F ⊆ R[(θ ω ) ω∈Ω, ∈{1,2,3} ] as follows: F consists of all polynomials of the form P, Q, R, α i , α i β j ± α j β i , α 1 β 2 γ 3 + α 2 β 3 γ 1 with α, β, γ ∈ {A, . . . , G} and i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i = j.
Note that F is finite and it contains all polynomials that are explicitly used in the present proof.
We now assume that u = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) ∈ U F ∩ Y so that there are infinitely many, hence at least three, values of x that can be extended to a CMNE. By (18), p = q = r = 0. Therefore P, Q, R ∈ F implies that P = Q = R = 0. We distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: A = 0. The system of equations (13), (14) and (15) is linear. The determinant of the associated matrix is b 1 c 3 d 2 + b 2 c 1 d 3 . There is more than one solution if and only if this determinant vanishes. As B 1 C 3 D 2 + B 2 C 1 D 3 ∈ F, we conclude that B 1 C 3 D 2 + B 2 C 1 D 3 = 0 so that, in particular, BCD + BCD = 2BCD = 0. As the cases C = 0 and D = 0 can be treated similarly, we only consider the case B = 0. Then the system (13) - (15) becomes
If C = 0, then E 1 ∈ F implies that E 1 = 0. As A = 0, player 1 would be a dummy which was excluded. Similarly, if D = 0, F 2 ∈ F implies that F 2 = 0, i.e., player 2 would be a dummy which was also excluded. Hence, C = 0 = D. As z > 0, the first two equations together with
and so F = kD and E = kC. Thus, we have z = k so that z is uniquely determined. The polynomial H becomes H = Cxz + Dyz − Ex − F y − Gz + θ 222 = θ 222 − Gz = θ 222 − GE/C, and the distribution induced on outcomes is unique.
Case 2: A = 0. If B = 0 or C = 0, then E = 0 as well because R = 0 and A 2 , A 3 , E 1 ∈ F. By (13), the case B = C = 0 cannot occur because A 1 ∈ F.
(1) We first consider the subcase B = E = 0. As z > 0, y = 0, and A 1 ∈ R, (13) implies that a 1 y + c 1 = 0 so that C = 0 and y is uniquely determined. As P = 0, (A 3 C 1 − A 1 C 3 )F 2 = 0, and, (14), a 2 x + d 2 = 0 (because z = 0) so that x is uniquely determined which was excluded. Hence, A 3 C 1 = A 1 C 3 and A 1 G 3 + C 1 D 3 = 0. As C = 0, there exists k ∈ R \ {0} such that A = kC. Moreover, we have that D = −kG.
Now, from (13), we have that 0 = a 1 y + c 1 = (ky + 1)c 1 . Since c 1 = 0, we obtain ky + 1 = 0. Using that A = kC, it follows that Ay = kyC = −C. Substituting in (15), we obtain G = yD.
The polynomial that determines the probabilities on outcomes becomes H = Axyz + Cxz + Dyz − F y − Gz + θ 222 = −Cxz + Cxz + Gz − F y − Gz + θ 222 = θ 222 − F y and the distribution induced on outcomes is unique.
(2) The case C = E = 0 may be treated analogously to the former case.
(3) BC = 0. We first claim that either A = kB or A = kC, for some k ∈ R. Since R = 0, we have that
we conclude that A = kC for some k ∈ R, and the claim follows. Otherwise, we have that
and it follows that A = kB for some k ∈ R. By our claim the following cases might occur:
(3.1) There exists k = 0 such that A = kB. Substituting this expression into B 2 (A 1 C 3 − A 3 C 1 ) = A 2 (A 3 E 1 + B 1 C 3 ) we obtain C 1 = −kE 1 . Hence, C = −kE. From (12) we may conclude that k ∈ {−1, −2}. Then,
and the following subcases may occur:
i. kF 2 + D 2 = 0: Then kF + D = 0. Equations (13) and (14) become b 1 y(1 + kz) = e 1 (1 + kz);
b 2 x(1 + kz) = f 2 (1 + kz).
If b 2 x = f 2 , then x is unique. Thus, from equation (14), we obtain that 1 + kz = 0. It follows that Az = kBz = −B and H = −Bxy + Bxy − kExz − kF yz − Ex − F y − Gz + θ 222 = θ 222 − Gz.
ii. kF 2 + D 2 = 0: Then B 1 E 3 − B 3 E 1 = 0 and B 1 G 3 − D 3 E 1 = 0. From B = 0 we obtain that E = mB. We consider the following subcases:
A. D = 0. Then, from B 1 G 3 −D 3 E 1 = 0 and B = 0, we obtain that G = 0. Equation (15) becomes x(b 3 y − e 3 ) = 0 and since 0 < x < 1 we get b 3 y = e 3 , that is, b 3 y = mb 3 , i.e. y = m. Then, H = mkBxz + mBx − mkBxz − mBx − mF + θ 222 = θ 222 − mF . B. D = 0. As B 1 G 3 − D 3 E 1 = 0 there exists ∈ R such that E = B and G = D.
Hence, = m. Moreover, Equation (13) 2) The case that A = kC may be treated similarly.
